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LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT: MOVING THE FULCRUM
PETER WEBB*
I. INTRODUCTION
While countless articles and commentaries have been published
about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, as well as the
appropriateness of governmental responses, the end result has been a
heightened concern over the structure, oversight, and stability of the
largest financial institutions in the United States.1 The clearest example
of the U.S. Government’s response was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).2 The DoddFrank Act significantly increased regulatory oversight of large banks in
an effort to increase stability in the complex and interconnected United
States and global financial systems.3 However, significant changes
* Mr. Webb graduated from the University of North Carolina School of Law in 2015 and is
now a licensed attorney in New York City, where he is an Associate in a Commercial Banking
Group at a major law firm. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily reflect those of the either the North Carolina Banking Journal or any organization
of which the author is a member or associate.
The author would like to thank Professor Lissa Broome, Caroline Keen and the editors and
staff of the North Carolina Banking Journal for their efforts in publishing this article, as well
as the many colleagues and friends who contributed their time and talent to its production. In
particular, the author thanks Professor John Coyle, Professor Alexa Chew, Professor Melissa
Jacoby, Valerie Hughes, Stephen Kessing, Holland West and Jessica West for their
comments, contributions and patience.
1. One of the most significant regulatory changes promulgated in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was the creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the authorization for it to designate certain banks and other financial
institutions as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” or “SIFIs.” See 12 U.S.C. §
5463 (2012).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see Helen Cooper, Obama
Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010) (“The law subjects more
financial companies to federal oversight and regulates many derivatives contracts while
creating a consumer protection regulator and a panel to detect risks to the financial system. . . .
The law expands federal banking and securities regulation from its focus on banks and public
markets, subjecting a wider range of financial companies to government oversight.”).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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within large financial institutions and improved oversight thereof have
proven difficult as the diversity, sophistication, and interconnectedness
of the modern financial services industry pose increasingly complex
regulatory challenges.4
In furtherance of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, bank
regulators called for reduced risk in many areas of the financial markets,
including leveraged lending.5 While leveraged lending is difficult to
define specifically, it generally encompasses large loans to corporate
borrowers for the purposes of “mergers and acquisitions, business
recapitalization and financing, equity buyouts, and business . . .
expansions.”6 The common attributes of leveraged loans are that they
involve greater risk because of the size of the loan relative to the
borrower’s cash flow and they are generally used to finance one-time
business transactions rather than a company’s ordinary course of business
activities.7 Such loans obviously increase the amount of debt in a
company’s capital structure, but therefore can also increase the
company’s earnings per share or return on equity.8
Interagency Guidance first published on March 22, 2013
(“Guidance”), included a general warning against these kinds of loans to
borrowers with high leverage ratios or other characteristics that might
indicate an inability of the borrowers to repay the loans.9 The underlying
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Preamble to the Act states its purpose, “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id.
4. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and
the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 341 (1989) (“There is a
social price to be paid for all this financial innovation. Among other things, these new
financial products and the underlying process through which they arise and evolve can
generate enormous risks of virtually unfathomable complexity for the increasingly
interdependent world capital markets.”); Steven McNamara, Informational Failures in
Structured Finance and Dodd-Frank’s “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating
Agencies,” 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 665, 671 (2012) (describing the “spectacular
growth in the sophisticated financial products developed on Wall Street over the past 25
years”).
5. See Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766 (Mar. 22,
2013).
6. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Leveraged Lending: Comptroller’s
Handbook, 1 (Feb. 2008).
7. See id. at 1–3.
8. Id.
9. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17772.
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rationale for the guidance was to encourage a minimum standard of
creditworthiness for commercial borrowers and adequate risk
management by commercial banks.10 These measures, in turn, were
intended to improve the creditworthiness and stability of the banks that
held the loans and the market for such debt overall.11
Commercial banks, however, are not disinterested intermediaries
but rather for-profit corporations that must answer to shareholders as well
as to government regulators. Participating in leveraged lending can
provide banks additional return to their shareholders. As capital market
participants, banks impose higher interest rates and fees on less
creditworthy and, thus riskier, borrowers. Furthermore, syndicated
lending allows commercial banks to act as arrangers by finding other
lenders and investors to underwrite the various portions of commercial
loans, thus spreading the risk to multiple parties.12 This means that a
bank, if arranging but not underwriting an entire loan, may avoid
exposure to both default and counterparty risk while still collecting fees

At a minimum, an institutions’ underwriting standards should
consider . . . borrower’s capacity to repay and ability to de-lever to a
sustainable level over a reasonable period. As a general guide,
institutions also should consider whether base cash flow projections show
the ability to fully amortize senior secured debt or repay a significant
portion of total debt over the medium term. Also, projections should
include one or more realistic downside scenarios that reflect key risks
identified in the transaction.
The Guidance was issued jointly by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”). Id. at 17766.
10. See Douglas Landy et al., U.S. Bank Regulatory Agencies Issue Final Guidance on
Leveraged Lending Practices: High-level Considerations for Financial Institutions, 28
BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L BANKING AND FIN. L. 333, 333 (2013) [hereinafter
BUTTERWORTHS] (“In an effort . . . to address the potential for deteriorating underwriting
practices by U.S. financial institutions . . . the U.S. federal bank regulatory agencies have
issued final joint guidance for the Financial Institutions that they supervise and which engage
in leveraged lending activities.”).
11. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17772 (“The
originating institution should be mindful of reputational risks associated with poorly
underwritten transactions, as these risks may find their way into a wide variety of financial
instruments and exacerbate systemic risks within the general economy.”).
12. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6 (“Syndication of
leveraged loans allows originating lenders to serve client needs while at the same time
ensuring appropriate risk diversification in their permanent loan portfolios.”) The handbook
goes on to explain the benefits of syndication to both banks and borrowers. Id.
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for the arrangement of a leveraged loan.13 Finally, institutional and other
corporate debt investors have developed an increased appetite for higher
interest-bearing investments and corporate borrowers have an increasing
need for capital.14 The cumulative effect of these interests creates
heightened market pressure on banks to arrange precisely the kinds of
leveraged loans that government regulators seek to limit.15
This pressure resulted in increased volume of leveraged loan
origination from 2009 through 2015.16 The Shared National Credits
Program 2014 Review (“SNC Program” or “2014 SNC Review”)
highlighted an increase in leveraged loan activity and the growing gap
between industry practice and regulator expectations.17 As leveraged
loan commitments totaled approximately $767 billion 2014 and over one
trillion dollars in 2015, it is clear that the leveraged loan market is a
significant component of the U.S. and global financial systems and plays
a pivotal part in the health of such systems.18 Regulators, therefore, must
find more effective ways to reduce the systemic risk posed by the
issuance of these high-risk, leveraged commercial loans.
This article analyzes the Guidance issued jointly by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance

13. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Six Years of Low Interest Rates in Search of Some Growth, THE ECONOMIST

(Apr. 6, 2013) (“[I]n their desperate search for yield, investors are rediscovering a worrying
appetite for the kind of structured debt products that many had thought had disappeared for
good after 2008.”).
15. See Meredith Coffey, Considerable Confusion: Syndication Loan Market
Sideswiped by Regulation, ABF JOURNAL, (May/June 2014) (“While banks say that the
regulators are pressuring them not to originate or distribute criticized loans, the market
appears to be awash with them.”).
16. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Company,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Shared National Credits Program Review 2014:
Leveraged Loan Supplement 4 (Nov. 2014) [hereinafter Shared National Credits Program
Review 2014] (noting significant growth in the leveraged loan market year-on-year); Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Company, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Shared National Credits Program Review 2015 3 (Nov. 2015)
[hereinafter Shared National Credits Program Review 2015] (noting a 5.3 percent increase
in total SNC commitments to $3.9 trillion, and an 18.5 percent increase in Substandard dollar
volume from 2014, largely due to a downturn in the oil and gas industry).
17. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16 (“The review . . .
found serious deficiencies in underwriting standards and risk management of leveraged loans.
Overall, the SNC [Shared National Credits] review showed gaps between industry practices
and the expectations of safe-and-sound banking articulated in in the 2013 guidance.”).
18. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16.

2016]

LEVERAGED LENDING

95

Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) and argues
that such external regulation is not the most effective way of reducing
risk in the syndicated loan market. Part II analyzes the Guidance itself.
Part III looks more closely at recent market trends in leveraged lending.
Part IV examines the enforcement tools available to regulators when
enforcing the Guidance. Part V considers the syndication of leveraged
loans and the emergence of the leveraged loan market as an alternative to
high-yield bonds, and draws parallels between the mechanics of loan
syndication and the sub-prime mortgage market leading up to the 2008
crisis. Part VI considers how a self-regulatory body might more
effectively influence and regulate lending activity by more clearly
articulating, monitoring and enforcing regulatory expectations. Part VII
concludes
II. LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE
The Guidance responded directly to increasingly risky activity in
the leveraged lending market in 2013 and revised existing regulatory
guidance.19 This section describes the Guidance in detail, including the
regulators’ goals for banks and the particular mechanisms that regulators
expected banks to implement in order to meet those goals.
A.

Guidance in Context

The overriding concern of regulators is that excessively risky
lending will put bank balance sheets at risk, as well as introduce too much
risk into the financial system as a whole.20 The Guidance is
fundamentally a statement from bank regulators expressing an
expectation that banks change their underwriting and lending practices
by arranging and issuing fewer high-risk loans to companies with too
much debt.21 Specifically, the Guidance discourages banks from making
19. On March 22, 2013, Guidance updated and revised a 2001 Guidance, as well as the
Comptroller’s Handbook for Leveraged Lending, published in 2008. Interagency Guidance
on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17768 (Mar. 22, 2013); see OCC Bulletin 200118; Board SR Letter 01-9, “Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Financing” (Apr. 9, 2001);
Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6
20. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17770.
21. Id.
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“leveraged loans,” but provides only a general definition of such loans
and ultimately leaves the precise definition of the term to the banks
themselves.22 However, the Guidance does list a number of factors that
banks should consider when crafting an internal working definition of
leveraged loans and articulating their risk management policies for such
lending.23 Those factors include: (i) a borrower’s debt to EBITDA ratio;
(ii) covenant levels; (iii) ability of the borrower to amortize its senior
secured debt and de-lever its balance sheet; (iv) the expectation of
financial support from a deal sponsor and the capacity of such sponsor to
fulfill that expectation; (v) the level of due diligence performed in
evaluating the loan; and (vi) the level of “reliance on enterprise value
and . . . valuation methodologies” employed in evaluating loan
repayment.24
However, the Guidance also suggests that no one of these factors
will automatically trigger regulatory criticism of a loan and that a loan
with one or several suspect characteristics might still be appropriate in
some circumstances.25 For example, when higher leverage ratios are the
norm in a particular industry, or if there is a well-founded and
documented reason to believe that a borrower’s income will increase
dramatically over the term of the loan, a loan with a higher leverage ratio
or a covenant-lite loan may be appropriate.26 Instead, the Guidance
22. Id. at 17768.
23. See David A. Brittenham et al., What’s New: Leveraged Lending Guidance, 14

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REP. 1 (Winter 2014) (noting that the Guidance
suggests that the following loan attributes cause regulatory concern: “(1) the borrower’s total
leverage ratio of debt to EBITDA exceeds 6:1; (2) the borrower would not pay off roughly
half of its debt over 5-7 years; (3) typical financial maintenance covenants are not included
(“covenant-lite loans”); or (4) the borrower may sell or exchange collateral or cash flow
without lender approval.”).
24. See 78 Fed. at 17772–73. Debt to EBITDA is a measure of a company’s debt load
divided by its cash flow, as expressed by EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax,
Depreciation, and Amortization); Katherine Arline, What is EBITDA?, BUS. NEWS DAILY
(Feb. 25, 2015); See infra notes 45 through 47.
25. The Guidance states that “[a]t a minimum, an institution’s underwriting standards
should consider” the above mentioned characteristics, but does not go so far as to state that
any loan with these characteristics shall be subject to regulatory criticism. 78 Fed. Reg. at
17772 (Mar. 22, 2013).
26. See Interagency Press Release, Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) for Implementing
March 2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (Nov. 7, 2014) (released as part of
the Shared National Credits Report, infra note 60). For further discussion of covenant–lite
loans, see Allison Collins, Loosening Up with Covenant Lite Loans, AM. BANKER, July 28,
2014 (“The shift back to covenant-lite loans — which eliminate lender protections such as
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“set[s] forth in new detail certain expectations with respect to the factors
a financial institution must consider in its underwriting process.” 27 In
short, the Guidance expresses regulators’ expectation that banks only
underwrite or issue loans to creditworthy borrowers.28
B.

Outcome and Diligence Focused Approach

Rather than providing clear limits on leveraged loans, the
Guidance requires that banks issuing leveraged loans adequately evaluate
the creditworthiness of the borrower and the suitability of each loan.29
This approach is consistent with prior guidance from banking regulators
in that it merely requires that banks have systems in place that measure
and document the risk profile of each credit.30 The Guidance does not
establish a bright line rule for banks on whether to issue specific kinds of
leveraged loans and instead prescribes what risk management policies
must achieve rather than what they must avoid.31
The Guidance indicates that banks underwriting leveraged loans
can avoid regulatory scrutiny and criticism by maintaining thorough
records that reflect an objective evaluation of the risk of such loans.
Appropriate risk management procedures regarding the issuance of
leveraged loans include: (i) clear policies articulating a bank’s risk
appetite for both the issuance and retention of loans; (ii) valuation
standards for borrowers both at the time of issuance and on an ongoing
basis throughout the term of the loans; (iii) ongoing management and
monitoring of deal flow within a bank in general; (iv) accurate and timely
restrictions on third party debt and ratios governing leverage and interest coverage —
represents a change for banks, which lately have had the upper hand in lending discussions.”).
27. Brittenham, supra note 23.
28. Brittenham, supra note 23.
29. See Interagency Press Release, supra note 26 (released as part of the Shared National
Credits Report, infra note 60) (“Institutions should use the characteristics outlined in the
Guidance as a starting point for developing an institution-specific definition of leveraged
loans, which takes into account the institution’s individual risk management framework and
risk appetite.”); see also id. at 2 (“Q2: Are all loans that meet any one common characteristic,
such as exceeding three times senior debt or four times total debt divided by earning before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), automatically considered
leveraged? [Answer] No. Leverage is an important indicator, but it should be considered in
relation to other loan characteristics.”)
30. Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6
31. See Interagency Press Release, supra note 26.
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exposure reporting and analytics; and (v) articulated policies for
analyzing sponsors’ financial support. 32 In short, banks must have
clearly articulated risk monitoring and risk management policies and the
decision to underwrite any particular loan must be made within the scope
of such policies.
The Guidance requires banks to implement these policies to
monitor and control the risk levels of not only the loans that they issue
and loan participations that they purchase, but also loans that they
underwrite or merely arrange.33 That is to say that banks have an equal
responsibility to independently assess the creditworthiness of a particular
credit to a borrower regardless of whether they will maintain the credit
on their balance sheet. This requirement reflects a shift in the regulatory
framework as it aims to reduce both risk to the lending bank as well as
systemic risk to other institutions created by the issuance and syndication
of risky loans.34 Banks are therefore responsible not only for closely
monitoring their own exposure to leveraged lending, but also for ensuring
that high-risk leveraged loans are not issued and disbursed into the greater
financial system.35
C.

Default Versus Repayment

The Guidance requires banks to primarily consider the likelihood
of default, rather than the likelihood of loss.36 This is a subtle but
important distinction, as lenders to a borrower in default may
nevertheless be paid in full if the lenders’ loans are senior in the
borrower’s capital structure, and especially if the lenders are fully secured
32. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17772–75 (Mar.
22, 2013).
33. See id. at 17772 (“Financial institutions purchasing participations and assignments in
leveraged lending transactions should make a thorough, independent evaluation of the
transaction and the risks involved before committing any funds.”); Id. (“A financial
institution’s underwriting standards should be clear, written and measurable, and should
accurately reflect the institution’s risk appetite for leveraged transactions.”).
34. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“It appears that the Guidance has a dual mandate. The
first . . . exists to protect the safety and soundness of the banks. . . . The second mandate is to
ensure that “high risk” loans do not go into the system.”).
35. See Coffey, supra note 15.
36. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“[T]he leveraged and criticized definitions do not seem to
look at the expected loss of the bank’s position, but rather at the probability that the company
might default.”).
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in an asset based loan.37 The Guidance’s more cautious approach reflects
the general purpose to reduce risk to both banks individually and the
financial system as a whole. However, the Guidance’s design also
constricts banks’ flexibility in offering loans, even loans that are
collateralized and very likely to be repaid.
A common metric for evaluating the creditworthiness of a
borrower is its enterprise value.38 Broadly speaking, evaluating
enterprise value is the kind of inquiry in which bankers specialize, as the
feasibility and profitability of commercial loans, mergers and
acquisitions, and spin-offs all largely depend on what a company is
actually worth as a whole. The determination of enterprise value is highly
case-specific, and several methods are often used to arrive at a final
calculation. For example, the book value of a company is essentially the
value of the company’s assets minus liabilities on its balance sheet,39
while other methods look at the earnings per share that a company has
been able to produce over a specific period of time and compares those
earnings to those of similar businesses.40 Finally, analysts might consider
the liquidation value of the company by valuing solely the company’s
assets, independent of their use in the business as currently configured. 41
Sometimes a company with multiple business lines may even be worth
more if broken up than if it continues as a single entity. 42 The Guidance,
however, indicates a general preference for cash flow or income analysis
as the valuation method over other valuation methods.43 The cash flow
37. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“Thus, a small, well-structured ABL [Asset Based Loan]
loan sitting atop a leveraged capital structure still may be criticized, even though it is a safe
loan itself.”).
38. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773 (“Institutions
often rely on enterprise value and other intangibles when (1) evaluating the feasibility of a
loan request; (2) determining the debt reduction potential of planned asset sales; (3) assessing
a borrower’s ability to access the capital markets; and (4) estimating the strength of a
secondary source of repayment.”).
39. See Ian H. Giddy, Methods of Corporate Valuation (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:25 AM),
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/valuationmethods.htm.
40. See id.
41. Howard Rosen, James Nicholson & Jeff Rodgers, Going Concern Versus
Liquidation Valuations, The Impact On Value Maximization In Insolvency Situations, FTI
CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE GRP. (Apr. 10, 2015, 11:33 AM),
http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/going-concern-versusliquidation-valuations-the-impact-on-value-maximization-in-insolvency-situations.pdf.
42. See Giddy, supra note 39.
43. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773 (“Final
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analysis is preferable because regulators believe that borrowers should be
expected to pay their debts from cash flow, not from the sale of existing
assets. Here again, the Guidance seems to emphasize that banks should
consider the ability of a borrower to avoid default (not just ultimate loss)
and repay the loan exclusively with earnings rather than with proceeds
from assets.44
Cash flow, however, can be defined in a multiple ways. Modern
credit agreements often use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization expense (“EBITDA”) as a proxy for cash flow.45 More
recently, however, the defined term “Adjusted EBITDA” has been
introduced as a measure for cash flow and can include add-backs for onetime transactions and expenses.46 These adjustments to EBITDA should
provide a more realistic picture of a borrower’s cash flow going forward,
but the definition can also be negotiated by the borrower to include addbacks that may artificially increase its cash flow.47
D.

Pipeline and Information Management

Since banks often commit to funding a leveraged loan before the
loan is fully syndicated, at any given time a bank will have outstanding
commitments to fund loans without knowing exactly when the loan will

estimates [of enterprise value] should be based on the method or methods that give
supportable and credible result. In many cases, the income method is generally considered the
most reliable.”).
44. Regulators’ preference for the use of discounted cash flow analysis suggests that
banks should focus on the borrower’s ability to pay back the loan from income, rather than
with proceeds from asset sales and other liquidations. See id.
45. Richard Wight, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 292–93,
McGraw-Hill, 2009.
46. See Ningzhong Li, Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts, 48 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 1103 (2010); Josef Rashty & John O’Shaughnessy, Reporting Disclosures Using NonGAAP Financial Measures, CPA J. 36, 36–38 (Mar. 2014) (describing various adjustments to
EBITDA in the context of SEC required financial reporting).
47. See Li, supra note 46; Rashty & O’Shaughnessy, supra note 46 (describing various
adjustments to EBITDA in the context of SEC required financial reporting). Since credit
agreements are negotiated contracts, “Adjusted EBITDA” can mean whatever the parties
agree it should mean and the borrower may negotiate the inclusion of certain revenues into
the calculation without including the commensurate expenses. Furthermore, the borrower and
lender might agree that certain one-time transactions will be included in the calculation of
Adjusted EBITDA.
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be issued.48 This process creates a “pipeline” of loans at various stages
of syndication to which a bank has committed.49 The Guidance requires
banks to thoroughly implement and document a policy for managing its
pipeline and credit commitments.50 For example, banks should place
“limits on aggregate pipeline commitments; limits on the amount of loans
the institution is willing to retain on its own books . . . and limits on the
underwriting risk that will be undertaken for amounts intended for
distribution.”51 In addition to considering the “performance of the
pipeline against original expectations,” banks should also “conduct
periodic stress tests on pipeline exposures to quantify the potential impact
of changing economic and market conditions.”52 While banks monitored
their loan pipelines before the Guidance was issued, the Guidance
clarified and emphasized regulators’ concerns regarding deal flow.
Under the Guidance, banks are also expected to closely monitor
risky and leveraged loans individually, including non-performing loans.53
The Guidance requires banks to have Management Information Systems
in place to ensure that managers and directors are adequately informed of
credit exposures, including both outstanding credits and those in the
pipeline.54 Again, the Guidance requires banks to accomplish a certain
level of monitoring without clearly specifying how banks can
demonstrate compliance or otherwise providing a safe harbor for banks.55
Furthermore, “the [a]gencies do not state whether examinations will
emphasize particular statements in the Guidance more than others,” or
48. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 6 (describing the
syndication process).
49. For the purposes of the Guidance, the pipeline includes only committed loan
underwriting and not “best efforts” deals.
50. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17774 (Mar. 22,
2013); see BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10 at 333. (“The Guidance emphasizes that a Financial
Institution should have strong risk management controls over leveraged loan transactions in
its pipeline, including loans to be held and distributed, in order to avoid incurring material
losses in a market environment where selling down such loans is difficult.”).
51. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10, at 336 (“The Agencies do not, however, offer
clarity regarding the manner in which the Guidance will be expected to be practically applied
to, and affect the availability of, credit provided to borrowers by Financial Institutions.”);
Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774.
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whether the Guidance itself will be the basis of any formal regulatory
enforcement actions.56 While the requirement for some kind of risk
management strategy instead of bright line rules defining risky leveraged
loans provides issuing banks with greater flexibility to tailor loan
products to borrowers in evolving and dynamic market conditions, it also
fails to provide predictability regarding regulatory scrutiny, criticism, and
enforcement.57
III. REGULATORY REMEDIES
As described above, the Guidance sets out risk management
expectations in broad terms by describing desired outcomes. Regulators
have a variety of tools at their disposal to encourage or require banks to
achieve those outcomes and observe safe and sound lending practices.
This section provides an overview of ways in which bank regulators
initially sought to implement the risk management requirements
discussed in the previous section.
A.

Loan Ratings

The first consequence of issuing an overly leveraged loan is a
poor loan rating assigned by regulators and, potentially, rating agencies.58
The Guidance indicates that the rating agencies’ ratings of a borrower
may not always correspond with regulatory ratings of a loan to that
borrower.59 Syndicated loans receive one of five ratings from regulators,
which are divided into two classes, adversely classified and not adversely
classified. “Pass/satisfactory”60 and “special mention”61 loans are not
56. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774.
57. See Coffey, supra note 15 (“Despite being more than a year old as of this writing

[May 2014], there is still mass confusion around what the Leveraged Lending Guidance is
supposed to do.”).
58. See Coffey, supra note 15.
59. See BUTTERWORTHS, supra note 10, at 333 (“Notably, borrowers do not appear to be
considered investment-grade by virtue of the ratings assigned to them by credit rating
agencies . . . [I]t is possible that investment-grade ratings issued to borrowers by credit rating
agencies are overridden by such tests in the Guidance.”).
60. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Pass – A
credit that is in good standing and is not criticized in any way.”).
61. Id. (“Special mention assets have potential weaknesses that deserve management’s
close attention. If left uncorrected, these potential weaknesses could result in further
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adversely classified, while loans rated “substandard,”62 “doubtful,”63 or
“loss”64 are adversely classified. A “criticized” loan is any loan that is
not rated “pass.”65 While a single criticized or classified loan may not
have serious repercussions for a bank that underwrites or arranges many
loans, the Guidance makes clear that issuing such loans is not advisable.66
B.

Informal and Formal Regulatory Measures

At the institutional level, the various bank regulators have several
monitoring, compliance, and enforcement tools at their disposal.
Regulators are expected to communicate frequently with a bank, both
formally and informally, during the bank’s examination process.67 When
bank examiners have concerns regarding a bank’s risk profile, those
concerns must be expressed formally and in writing as “matters requiring
attention” or “MRA”s.68 Examiners label more serious concerns found
deterioration of the repayment prospects, or in the institutions’ credit position in the future.
Special mention assets are not adversely rated and do not expose institutions to sufficient risk
to warrant adverse rating.”).
62. Id. (“Loans classified Substandard are inadequately protected by the current sound
worth and paying capacity of the obligor or of the collateral pledged, if any. Substandard
assets have a well-defined weakness or weaknesses that jeopardize the liquidation of the debt.
They are characterized by the distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some loss if the
deficiencies are not corrected.”); see also, FDIC, “How Do Examiners Assign Loan
Classifications on Your Examination?” 2012 New York Region Directors College
Monroeville,
PA,
at
slide
4,
available
at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/college/ny/materials/2012-loans.pdf.
63. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Doubtful assets
have all of the weaknesses inherent in those classified substandard and when the weaknesses
make collection or liquidation in full, on the basis of currently known information, highly
questionable and improbable.”).
64. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Assets
classified as Loss are uncollectible and of such little value that their continuance as a bankable
asset is not warranted. Amounts classified as loss should be promptly charged off. This
classification does note that there is no recovery or salvage value, but rather that it is not
practical or desirable to defer writing off these assets even though some value may be
recovered in the future.”).
65. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“Criticized
assets include all assets rated special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss.”).
66. See supra notes 9 through 11, and accompanying text.
67. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Bank
Supervision Process 32 (Jan. 2010) (“Communication should be ongoing throughout the
supervision process and must be tailored to a bank’s structure and dynamics.”).
68. See id. at 100 (“Examiners shall describe the practices that resulted in the concerns,
as well as the board’s or management’s commitment to corrective action, in “Matters
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during an examination as “matters requiring immediate attention” or
“MRIAs.”69 For instance, Credit Suisse received an MRIA in July 2014
warning that its underwriting standards did not meet regulators’
expectations.70 Reports indicate that other banks have received MRA
letters regarding leveraged lending activities.71 The Credit Suisse letter
was intended as a clear message not only to Credit Suisse, but to the entire
industry that the Guidance should be taken seriously and that banks
should change certain facets of their lending practices.72 As one observer
noted, “[t]he timing of the news - which coincided with Credit Suisse’s
annual leveraged finance conference in Florida - also raised eyebrows
and led many to conclude that regulators wanted to make an example of
the bank and cause it as much embarrassment as possible.”73 Thus, the
Credit Suisse letter was an informal enforcement action well-calculated
to send a clear message not just to Credit Suisse, but to makers of
leveraged loans more generally.74
Regulators may also employ more serious formal enforcement
tools.75 Generally, banks that promptly take appropriate measures to
respond to MRAs or MRIAs will not face formal enforcement actions,
Requiring Attention” (MRA) in the ROE or in other periodic formal written communication.”
Id. at 32.); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank
Identification, Rehabilitation, and Resolution 24 (Jan. 2001) (“MRAs should address bank
practices that ‘deviate from sound fundamental principles and are likely to result in financial
deterioration if not addressed,’ or that ‘result in substantive noncompliance with laws.’”)
(internal citations omitted); Ryan Tracy, Feds Win Fight Over Risky-Looking Loans, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015) (“Starting in late summer [2013], roughly a dozen big banks received a
Matters Requiring Attention letter from the OCC and Fed . . . Regulators ‘came down and
started auditing for [lax and inadequate application of the leveraged loan guidelines] – and I
mean auditing hard, every one of us’).
69. See Gillian Tan & Ryan Racy, Credit Suisse Loans Draw Fed Scrutiny, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 16, 2014).
70. Id.
71. See id.; Tessa Walsh & Natalie Harrison, RLPC-IFR-Lenders Cowed by Fed Rebuke
on US Leveraged Loans, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2014) (“Although no other banks received
MRIA letters at the same time as Credit Suisse in July, other Fed-regulated banks also
received less pressing ‘Matters Requiring Attention’ letters at the same time, two loan bankers
said. ‘Other banks have got letters. The reason that Credit Suisse drew comment is that they
were asked to do something urgently,’ the loan syndicate head said.”).
72. Natalie Harrison et al., Fed Slaps Credit Suisse for Risky Lending, REUTERS (Sept.
22, 2014).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Donald R. Glancz & Meredith Boylan, Overview of Federal Bank Enforcement
Actions, VENABLE LLP (2012).
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but this is not always the case.76 Formal enforcement actions that may
pertain to leveraged lending include cease and desist orders, formal
written agreements under U.S. federal law, and Prompt Corrective Action
Directives.77 To date, no formal enforcement actions have been reported
that specifically target any single bank’s leveraged lending practices.78
C.

CAMELS Ratings

More broadly, a bank’s leveraged lending activities can have a
substantial impact on a bank’s CAMELS rating.79 Regulators assess a
bank’s safety and soundness on a five-point scale, with a score of one
reflecting “sound in every respect” and five meaning “extremely unsafe
and unsound.”80 Banks receive a score of one to five in each of six
categories: “capital adequacy, asset quality, management capability,
earnings quantity and quality, the adequacy of liquidity, and sensitivity
to market risk” (thus, “CAMELS”).81 Finally, “[c]omposite ratings are
based on a careful evaluation of an institution’s managerial, operational,
financial, and compliance performance.”82
Noncompliance with the Leveraged Lending Guidance may
76. Id.; see OCC PPM 5310-3 at 8 (Sept. 9, 2011).
77. A PCA Directive would likely only be appropriate if a bank was undercapitalized

and seems a disproportionate response to merely issuing overly-leveraged loans. See
Comptroller of Currency. OCC 2011-37 and PPM 5310-3 (REV) at 5 (Sept. 9, 2011).
PCA actions are triggered by a bank’s capital category as defined in 12
USC 1831o, 12 CFR 6, and 12 CFR 165 Depending on a bank’s PCA
capital category, certain restrictions and actions are automatically
imposed by operation of law. Discretionary PCA actions include the
issuance of directives that impose actions or restrictions permitted or
otherwise required under 12 USC 1831o, 12 CFR 6, and 12 CFR 165.
Except in rare instances, the OCC provides prior notice of intent to issue
a PCA directive. Unlike some other enforcement actions, there is no
provision for an administrative hearing prior to the issuance of PCA
directives.
78. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71. The fact that the MRIA letter received by
Credit Suisse came as such a shock to market participants suggests that no more serious action
has yet been taken by regulators. See Harrison, supra note 70 (“This [letter to Credit Suisse]
is the first evidence in the market. It will absolutely have an effect. All risk managers will say
‘thank God it’s not us, and let’s look at it to make sure we’re not in the public eye’.”).
79. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 62 Fed. Reg. 752, 753 (Jan. 6, 1997).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

106

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

affect a bank’s CAMELS rating in several ways. First, when a bank holds
portions of leveraged loans that it has underwritten, or when a bank
purchases leveraged loan participations, the quality of those assets will
be directly reflected in the bank’s asset quality score.83 In fact, one of the
key factors in assessing asset quality is the “adequacy of underwriting
standards,” which is the precise focus of the Guidance.84 Criticized loans
are so rated, because they are considered poor quality assets. 85 What the
Guidance leaves ambiguous, however, is what amount of criticized loans
might impact a bank’s asset quality score, as the Guidance includes very
few concrete metrics.86
The Guidance does note that lenders should consider the ability
of borrowers to make payments on time even during an economic
downturn, which speaks specifically to the assessment of market risk over
the life of the loan.87 While, for example, a leverage level of 6X as
measured by debt to EBITDA triggers increased scrutiny, the Guidance’s
actual requirements are difficult to define concretely. 88 There are no
guarantees that a bank’s normal and downside projections will be
consistent with regulators’ projections at the time of examination as
market conditions can change rapidly, and small quantitative differences
in assumptions can lead to very different projections over a five to seven
year period.89 Thus, while a bank’s leveraged loan exposure can be a

83. See id. at 754 (“The asset quality rating reflects the quantity of existing and potential
credit risk associated with the loan and investment portfolios, other real estate owned, and
other assets, as well as off-balance sheet transactions.”).
84. Id. (“The asset quality of a financial institution is rated based upon . . . assessment
of the following evaluation factors: The adequacy of underwriting standards, soundness of
credit administration practices, and appropriateness of risk identification practices. . .”).
85. See supra notes 58 through 66, and accompanying text.
86. The Guidance and accompanying FAQ make clear that debt to EBITDA ratios of 6X
and greater will automatically draw increased regulatory scrutiny, as will the inability of a
borrower to amortize 50 percent of a loan within seven years, but carrying a marginal volume
of such loans, on its own, will not cause a bank’s asset quality score to drop. See Interagency
Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17772–73 (Mar. 22, 2013).
87. See Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg at 17773 (“Stress
tests of enterprise values and their underlying assumptions should be conducted and
documented at origination of the transaction and periodically thereafter, incorporating the
actual performance of the borrower and any adjustments to projections.”).
88. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text. While the Guidance does
require banks to model downside scenarios, it does not include parameters for creating such
models. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending 78 Fed. Reg. at 17774.
89. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text.
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significant part of its overall risk exposure, the Guidance leaves it to each
bank to develop its own policies for managing this exposure, while only
providing abstract parameters for what those policies must achieve.
For example, the Guidance goes to great lengths in describing the
management requirements for banks engaged in leveraged lending.90 As
discussed earlier, it requires that institutions have Management
Information Systems to ensure that managers have all the necessary
information to adequately monitor the institutions’ leveraged lending
exposures.91 Thus, the management component of an institution’s
CAMELS rating is the most appropriate area for regulators to reflect a
bank’s compliance or noncompliance with this aspect of the Guidance.
Leveraged lending can also impact a bank’s liquidity, because
even a relatively small decrease in the cash flow of a heavily leveraged
borrower can seriously affect its ability to make debt service payments
on time. In an economy-wide slowdown, this can potentially put a bank
in a serious capital or liquidity situation. This fact became abundantly
clear during the 2008 financial crisis as the uptick in mortgage defaults
sent ripple effects throughout the financial system. 92 Therefore, the
extent of a bank’s participation in the leveraged lending market can
significantly impact its liquidity score in its CAMELS rating. The
Guidance requires that banks have “[w]ritten policies and procedures for
defining and managing distribution failures and ‘hung’ deals, which are
identified by an inability to sell down the exposure within a reasonable
period (generally 90 days from transaction closing).”93 Inadequate
pipeline management resulting in either too many hung deals or simply
90. See supra notes 30, 53 through 57, and accompanying text. Each section of the
Guidance outlines the diligence and management requirements for institutions arranging and
underwriting leveraged loans. For example, “A financial institution’s management should
receive comprehensive reports about the characteristics and trends in such exposures at least
quarterly, and summaries should be provided to the institution’s board of directors.” Id. at
17774.
91. See supra notes 48 through 52, and accompanying text.
92. See William W. Land & Julapa A. Jagtiani, The Mortgage and Financial Crises: The
Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 38 ATL. ECON. J. 295, 296–305
(describing first phase of the Financial Crisis and noting, with the respect to financial
institutions investment in Residential Mortgage-backed Securities, “[w]ith this market
collapsing and because of doubts about counterparties’ creditworthiness due to large but
unquantified exposure to the mortgage market, many large financial firms faced a severe
liquidity squeeze that threatened their survival.”).
93. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17773.

108

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

committing financing for too many deals could also certainly affect a
bank’s liquidity rating.
While the Guidance does not have the force and effect of agency
regulation, let alone a statutory mandate, not complying with the
Guidance can have a wide range of consequences for banks. Banks have
already seen regulators take informal measures during their CAMELS
rating examinations, including the MRIA letter to Credit Suisse.94 As of
January 2016, it appears unlikely that any formal enforcement action,
such as a cease and desist order, will result from issuing criticized loans.95
Bank regulators appear to generally approve of the most recent changes
in underwriting standards.96 However, issuing loans that warrant
regulatory criticism can still adversely affect a bank’s CAMELS rating in
several ways ranging from lower CAMELS scores to MRIA or MRA
letters. While these are regarded as effective regulatory remedies to
ensure compliance, the opacity of the Guidance’s requirements poses a
challenge to implementation.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GUIDANCE
Despite the fact that regulators have a myriad of regulatory tools
at their disposal to implement the Guidance, it took nearly two years for
the volume of leveraged loans and average leverage ratios to drop in the
syndicated loan market, and regulators continue to express concern about
leveraged lending practices generally. The Guidance, although issued in
March 2013, generally had little impact on bank lending practices until
late 2014,97 and after a brief correction in 2015 there is renewed concern
94. See Tan & Racy, supra note 69; Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71.
95. The reaction to the Credit Suisse MRIA letter suggests that it was considered a

dramatic step. Id. Still, the SNC Leveraged Loan Supplement suggests that regulators will be
looking more closely at banks’ leveraged lending activity. See Shared National Credits
Program Review 2014, supra note 16 (“The agencies believe that an institution unwilling or
unable to implement strong risk management processes will incur significant risks and should
cease their participation in this type of lending until their processes improve sufficiently. As
a result of the recent SNC leveraged lending findings, supervisors will increase the frequency
of reviews around this business line to ensure risks are well understood and well controlled.”)
96. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 3 (“Examiners
noted improved compliance with underwriting expectations with regard to the 2013 leveraged
lending guidance and subsequent frequently asked question documents. However, gaps
between industry practices and the guidance remain.”
97. See, e.g., Sean Jones, U.S. Bank Regulators to Enforce Stricter Discipline on
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regarding underwriting standards.98 This section takes a closer look at
how individual banks and the market as a whole have responded to the
Guidance since its issuance.
A.

Inconsistent Application of Guidance By Different Regulators

Since the Guidance did not provide bright line rules defining,
prohibiting, or even classifying leveraged loans, many banks struggled to
understand and implement the Guidance,99 and leveraged lending
continued to grow well into 2014.100 In addition, enforcement of the
Guidance was uneven across the various bank regulators. According to
industry insiders, “the OCC . . . more frequently contact[ed] banks about
the issue and . . . OCC-regulated banks also received more verbal
warnings as well as official letters demanding fixes than banks that are
regulated just by the Fed.”101 It seemed, for a time, that leveraged lenders
might exploit agency differences in implementation through regulatory
arbitrage and take advantage of the Fed’s more lax enforcement.102
Finally, the lack of clarity may have led many banks to decline making
loans that may have been appropriate, thus pushing borrowers toward less
regulated non-bank lenders.103 As a result, some leveraged lending may
have moved into other sectors of the financial markets like “shadow
Leveraged Lending, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE (Aug. 12, 2014) (“There is no sign yet of a
reversal in the general trend towards weaker covenants, larger credit lines, narrower pricing
and other indications of slacker underwriting . . .”).
98. See Craig Torres & Nabila Ahmad, Wall Street Listens as Fed Wards on Risky Loans,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2015); Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16,
at 3 (Nov. 2015); Sridhar Natarajan, Wall Street Regulators Said to Step Up Leveraged-Loan
Focus, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2015).
99. See Coffey, supra note 15; Kristen Haunss, Fed Said to Work with OCC to Clarify
Leveraged-Loan Guidance, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2014).
100. See Gillian Tan, Debt Rises in Leveraged Buyouts Despite Warnings, THE WALL ST.
J. (May 20, 2014) (“Wall Street banks are financing more private-equity takeovers with higher
levels of debt, despite warnings by regulators to reduce the amount of risky loans they make.”)
101. Lauren LaCapra & Greg Roumeliotis, Update 1 -Insight- Fed, OCC Differ in
Enforcing Leveraged Lending Guidelines, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2014).
102. See id. (“Some sources said that it could create conditions that could eventually push
risky lending entirely out of the regulated banking sector and into the lightly-regulated realm
of shadow banking, consisting of firms such as private equity and hedge funds.”)
103. See Tom Braithwaite et al., Leveraged Loan Crackdown Drives Borrowers to
‘Shadow Banks,’ FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014); see also Kelly Thompson, Leveraged Loans:
Banks’ Share of Middle Market Pie Shrinks Further in 2013, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2014).
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banks” including Jeffries and other financial institutions not subject to the
same regulatory oversight as nationally or state chartered banks.104 While
such a shift would reduce leveraged lending risk to chartered banks, it
would also entail reduced regulation of the market as a whole, at least by
bank regulators.105
One indication of the confusion caused by the Guidance is the
number of client alerts published by Wall Street law firms, which as of
January 2016 include no less than five devoted entirely to the
Guidance.106 Anecdotal evidence suggests that bank managers and
directors continued to ask counsel to review the application of the
Guidance as late as July 2014, over a year after its publication. 107 The
Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters, and other news outlets also
published numerous articles and commentaries on the meaning and
significance of the Guidance.108

B.

Shared National Credits Review: A Report Card For Leveraged
Lending

The clearest indication of the Guidance’s effectiveness, however,
is the number and volume of leveraged loans issued by banks. An
examination of the 2014 Shared National Credits Review (“2014
104. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71 (referring to the tightening of credit and noting
that “[t]his could force some borrowers into the shadow banking market.”). Jefferies, for
example, is a pure investment bank and not a commercial bank, and therefore largely regulated
by the SEC and not the Fed, OCC or FDIC.
105. See Walsh & Harrison, supra note 71.
106. See Bank Regulators Issue Guidance on Leveraged Lending, CAHILL GORDON &
REINDEL LLP (Apr. 12, 2012); David A. Brittenham et al., What’s New: Leveraged Lending
Guidance, 14 DEBEVOISE & P LIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT No. 1 (2014); Federal
Banking Agencies Revamp Guidance on Leveraged Lending, SIMPSON THATCHER &
BARTLETT, LLP (Mar. 27, 2013); David C. Reamer et al., Bank Regulators Eye Leveraged
Lending, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Jan. 16, 2014)
Cephas, Derrick and Dimia Fogam, Bank Regulators Tackle Leveraged Lending, WEIL
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM CENTER (Mar. 2013).
107. At one firm, additional research into the Guidance was assigned as a project to
summer associates as late as July 2014.
108. See, e.g., Pedro Nicolaci de Costa, Fed Wants Better Compliance on Leveraged Loan
Guidelines, Report Says, WALL ST. J., (July 15, 2014); Haunss, supra note 99; Coffey, supra
note 15; Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Fed Warns of More Bank Scrutiny Over Leveraged Lending,
THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2014).
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Review”), a thorough annual analysis of outstanding credits, published
by the Fed, the FDIC, and the OCC, revealed that leveraged lending
continued to grow in the year following publication of the Guidance.109
The 2014 Review noted that the deficiencies in underwriting and risk
management standards, implementation, and controls persisted in the
leveraged lending market, and that the volume of higher risk loans had
increased substantially and continuously since 2009.110 Part 33 of the
2014 Review concisely summarized the trends in syndicated loan
underwriting:
The SNC examination noted weak underwriting
standards in 31 percent of the loan transactions sampled.
This percentage compared unfavorably to 2012, 2011,
2010 and 2009 percentages of 24 percent, 19 percent, 16
percent and 13 percent, respectively. Leveraged lending
transactions were the primary driver of this deterioration.
The most frequently cited underwriting deficiencies . . .
were minimal or no loan covenants, liberal repayment
terms, repayment dependent on refinancing, and
inadequate collateral valuations. The weak underwriting
structures were in part attributable to aggressive
competition and market liquidity.111
The 2014 Review even included a “Leveraged Loan Supplement”
(“Supplement”), as regulators paid particular attention to leveraged loans
in the 2014 SNC Review specifically to measure the effectiveness of the
109. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 4–5; see also Joint
Press Release by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance
Company, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Risk in the Shared National
Credits Portfolio is High; Leveraged Lending Remains a Concern (Nov. 17, 2014) (noting
“serious deficiencies in underwriting standards and risk management of leveraged loans.”).
110. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 4. Note that while
the SNC Review does not specifically define the term, “syndicated loans” generally refers to
loans underwritten by multiple banks, while “leveraged loans” refers to a subset of syndicated
loans that are considered more risky due to the debt burden on the borrower. See
LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!how-are-loans-syndicated
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
111. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 9. The Review
also includes a more detailed chart of classified and criticized loan percentages from 1989 to
2014 at page 10.
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2013 Guidance.112 Bank regulators concluded that the Guidance had not
been fully heeded and expressed concern at the level of risk persisting in
the leveraged loan market.113 The Supplement concluded that banks had
merely reduced interest rates and extended maturities to accommodate
overly-leveraged borrowers. This meant that banks were receiving
reduced returns on higher-risk loans, although these measures did ease
the debt burden on borrowers, making default less likely only for the short
term..114 Instead, regulators would have preferred to see banks take more
substantive steps to require or assist borrowers in de-levering their
balance sheets.115 These might include “implementation of new
covenants or tightening existing covenants; equity injections; line
reduction; step-ups to a term loan A structure with increased
amortization; the addition of collateral; [and] restrictions on new
acquisitions or issuance of additional debt.”116 The Supplement also
noted that banks should more diligently document their efforts to support
the credits they issue.117
Finally, the quantitative analysis in the 2014 SNC Review and the
Supplement showed continued growth in the leveraged loan market, and
particularly in more leveraged and risky credits.118 “[O]nly 77 percent of
borrowers are projected to repay 50 percent of total debt within seven
years, compared to 83 percent prior to June 1, 2013. . . [and] 15 percent
of [leveraged loan] transactions showed leverage in excess of 8.0X.” 119
The final paragraph of the Supplement noted that the increasing volume
112. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 9.
113. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6 (“While

institutions have formally addressed many of the risk management issues noted in the
guidance, execution and full implementation has not been achieved.”).
114. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“Steps taken by
institutions to strengthen non-pass credits were generally limited to a reduction in interest rate
or an extension of maturity, which are insufficient for meeting supervisors’ expectations for
such credits.”).
115. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“The agencies
expect a strategy that actively pursues and executes meaningful improvements in structure or
controls during the refinancing of a non-pass borrower.”)
116. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5.
117. Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 5 (“[E]xaminers
noted that institutions frequently did not identify and document efforts to strengthen these
[special mention] credits.”).
118. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6–7.
119. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 6–7.
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of poor quality loans increased systemic risk in credit markets as a
whole,120 and regulators indicated that they would step up their
monitoring efforts in leveraged lending and might even try to prevent
institutions from participating in the market if they did not meet the
expectations outlined in the Guidance.121
It was unsurprising that the 2014 SNC Review finally clarified
the Guidance. As Meredith Coffey of the Loan Syndications and Trading
Association (“LSTA”) pointed out in May of 2014, over a year after the
Guidance was issued:
[M]ost market participants say that the banks need to go
through another SNC exam to determine just how much
they are punished for underwriting or holding criticized
loans. Once that cycle has ended in summer 2014, the
market may have more clarity on just what is expected
from the Leveraged Lending Guidance.122
This perspective reflects not only the lack of clarity regarding regulators’
expectations for implementation of the Guidance, but also a sense that
market participants still needed to know what was at stake for
noncompliance.
The 2014 SNC Review provided a report card of sorts for the
leveraged lending market, and banks have since responded by reducing
leveraged lending to comply with the Guidance.123 During the fourth
quarter of 2014, “[d]ebt levels for companies funding takeovers in the
leveraged-loan market fell . . . for only the second time since 2012.”124
In the first quarter of 2015, the leveraged loan market was down 69
120. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 7.
121. See Shared National Credits Program Review 2014, supra note 16, at 7 (“The

agencies believe that an institution unwilling or unable to implement strong risk management
processes will incur significant risks and should cease their participation in this type of
lending until their processes improve sufficiently. As a result of the recent SNC leveraged
lending findings, supervisors will increase the frequency of reviews around his business line
to ensure risks are well understood and well controlled.”).
122. Coffey, supra note 15.
123. See Matthew Heller, Leveraged Lending Pullback Tied to Regulatory Scrutiny, CFO
(Oct. 23, 2014) http://ww2.cfo.com/credit/2014/10/leveraged-lending-pullback-tiedregulatory-scrutiny/.
124. Id.
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percent from 2014, and the drop has been at least partially attributed to
the Guidance.125 Standard & Poor’s also noted that the average debt-toEBITDA ratio for large leveraged buyouts dropped below the 6X
threshold, from a high of 6.3X in September 2014 to 5.6X in March
2015.126 Thus, although it took over 18 months from the publication of
the Guidance, it appeared that the Guidance was beginning to effectively
moderate banks’ leveraged lending activities and perhaps even improve
the quality of commercial credit and thus moderate risk in the financial
system as a whole.
The more recent Shared National Credits Program 2015 Review
(“2015 SNC Review”) presented only marginally improved market
conditions, noting “36.1 percent of leveraged transactions originated
within the past year exhibited structures that were cited as weak by
examiners.”127 The 2015 SNC Review included a smaller cross-section
of the leveraged lending market and noted that while underwriting
standards seemed to improve in the latter half of the year, many of the
same troubling characteristics of leveraged loans have continued to
persist, including borrowers’ inability to de-lever and reduce financial
covenants.128 Incremental facilities and other “accordion features” which
contemplate additional post-closing borrowings were also a principal
concern, though much of the report is devoted to challenges facing the oil
and gas sector due to dramatic drop in oil prices following years of rapid
expansion in the industry.129
Following the 2015 SNC Review, federal regulators have
renewed their focus on leveraged lending, which suggests that the
Guidance and other regulatory measures have failed to adequately

125. Christine Idzelis, Leveraged-Loan Sales Slump To Worst Since 2010 on Fed
Scrutiny, [2015] BANKING DAILY (BNA) NO. 67 (Apr. 8, 2015).
126. Id.
127. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 3.
128. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 9.
129. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 9 (“Incremental
facilities have been included in loan agreements for a number of years, but are drawing
attention because of their increased usage in conjunction with relaxation of other structural
elements such as covenants and restricted payments.”); Id. at 10 (noting challenges that oil
and gas companies face and that “the significant decreases in [oil and gas] market prices have
impaired many [oil and gas] companies’ ability to pay interest and principal, and has led to
some defaults.”)
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improve underwriting standards.130 Regulators now plan to conduct the
Shared National Credits Review biannually, instead of annually, and
several major commercial banks are already facing renewed scrutiny of
their leveraged lending and underwriting practices.131 In addition, some
signs indicate that the market itself is losing its appetite for riskier
loans.132 This suggests that even if bank underwriting standards improve
going forward, it will be due to market pressure, rather than regulatory
cajoling.
V. SYNDICATION ISSUES
The commercial banking and financial services industry has
evolved in a number of ways over the last several decades and syndicated
lending is just one example of innovation in the industry. This section
describes the convergence of syndicated lending and high-yield bond
products and goes on to describe the market conditions that have driven
this evolution. Finally, the section describes some parallels between
syndicated lending and the sub-prime lending markets.
A.

Convergence of Bond and Credit Agreement Structures

Banks generally syndicate large leveraged loans, meaning the
loans are underwritten and held by multiple banks and investors rather
than issued and held exclusively by the arranging bank or banks. This
has several important implications in today’s economic climate and
interconnected financial market structure. Over the last two decades, nonbanks have started to play a much more significant role in the syndicated
lending market.133 Non-banks can participate in both the initial syndicate
of lenders and purchase participations in a syndicated loan from an initial
lender.134 Furthermore, banks and other financial institutions can buy and
130. Natarajan, supra note 98 (describing trends in the leveraged lending market from
2009 to Q3 of 2015).
131. Natarajan, supra note 98.
132. See Natarajan, supra note 98 (noting that “a group of lenders led by Bank of America
Corp. and Morgan Stanley postponed a $5.5 billion debt package backing the biggest
leveraged buyout of the year after struggling to sell the debt to investors.”).
133. Wight, supra note 45.
134. See generally, Loan Syndication and Trading Association website:
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sell participations in syndicated loans on a fairly active market.135 Thus,
the syndicated loan market has begun to resemble the corporate bond
market and leveraged lending has become an alternative to high-yield
bond issuance.
Similarly, the documentation and features of many syndicated
loans, specifically term loans,136 has begun to resemble high-yield bond
indentures.137 For example, borrowers began negotiating more flexible
lender protections through mechanisms like “baskets,” which allow
certain uses of cash flow or additional debt, dividend payments by the
borrower, and the designation of unrestricted subsidiaries (subsidiaries
which are not obligors under the loan documents).138 Credit Agreements
have become more heavily negotiated contracts, like bond indentures,
and in some ways the primary difference between high-yield bonds and
leveraged loans is merely that bonds trade in much smaller denominations
and are therefore more liquid. Over time, the increased participation of
non-bank entities on the lender side of the syndicated lending market has
both increased lender-side demand for the instruments while also eroding
lender protections, which has also caused a convergence in terms for bank
and bond debt.139
B.

Low Interest Rates Have Driven Investors into Riskier
Investments

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, interest rates
remained at or near historic lows for over six years with the Fed
announcing only a one quarter of a percent increase above the near-zero
Federal Funds Rate on December 16, 2016.140 With only modest growth
http://www.lsta.org/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (the LSTA’s website includes a wealth
of current information regarding the U.S. syndicated loan market)
135. Id.
136. Wight, supra note 45, at 7–8. Syndicated loans take many forms, from revolving
credits that function much like a corporate credit card to amortizing term loans (historically
“tranche A” loans). Id. Historically, non-banks have invested in “tranche B” loans with
feautres like nominal amortization and longer maturity. Id.
137. See, e.g., Maura O’Sullivan and Benjamin Cheng, TERM LOANS AND HIGH YIELD
BONDS: TRACKING THE CONVERGENCE, Practical Law 60, 62–63 (July/Aug. 2012).
138. Id.
139. See id.; Wight, supra note 45, at 7–8.
140. See, e.g., John Carney, The Fed’s Rate Increase: A New Test Looms, WALL ST. J.

2016]

LEVERAGED LENDING

117

in the U.S. economy and anemic growth and recession fears elsewhere in
the world, the Fed still seems hesitant to raise interest rates dramatically
following the December 2015 increase.141 Low interest rates generally
encourage individuals and businesses to invest, as low yields on bank
deposits discourage saving.142 However, “[e]xcessively low rates help to
create bubbles because they allow investors to ignore the cost of
financing and concentrate on the capital gains if their strategy works; they
let people forget risk and focus too much on reward.”143
The extended period of low interest rates has resulted in
concentrated risk in a lower range of rates of return.144 For example, The
Economist noted in 2013 that “[c]ompanies with a junk-bond rating are
able to borrow at a rate that is four percentage points below the post-2000
average, according to Citigroup . . . whereas a typical investment-grade
company, ranked A, can borrow at 2.4% compared with an historical
norm of 5.1%.”145 Investors, particularly large institutional investors like
public and private pension funds that must keep pace with their
pensioners’ entitlements, must meet target rates of return that necessarily
reflect more risky today than ten years ago. Thus, while an investor could
hit its target rate of return in A-rated debt in 2004, that investor must now
invest in lower-rated (and thus riskier) debt to make the same return.
C.

Parallels With the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Today banks are acting, as they always have, as intermediaries
between parties that have liquid capital and those that need liquid capital.
As arrangers of syndicated loans, banks are able to match institutional
investors with corporate borrowers in need of financing. In the extended
period of low interest rates, however, both corporate borrowers and
institutional investors are clamoring for more loans—investors because
(Dec. 16, 2015); Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14.
141. See Jon Hilsenrath & Ben Leubsdorf, Fed Divided on June Rate Increase, but Soft
Data May Prove Deciding Factor, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2015) (“While ‘several’ officials
thought June would be the right time to raise rates, others thought it would be better to wait
longer and some thought the Fed might need to wait until 2016.”).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14.
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they have fewer options for even modest returns,146 and borrowers
because borrowing at a low rate of interest can facilitate expansion, as
well as improve return on equity by increasing the amount of debt (and
thus leverage) in a capital structure.147 Furthermore, banks are even more
directly incentivized to issue leveraged loans because they are able to
collect higher fees and interest for arranging and underwriting the loans,
particularly riskier loans.148
Structurally, at least, the current market dynamic is alarmingly
similar to the mortgage-backed securities market prior to the 2008
financial crisis.149 In the early-to-mid 2000s, mortgage originators wrote
mortgage loans to borrowers without a demonstrated ability to repay the
loan, depending instead on such borrowers’ ability to refinance or the
lender’s ability to recover their value through foreclosure and resale.150
Originators were not concerned with whether the loans were eventually
paid in full because of their ability to sell the loans to banks, who could
package and re-package many loans together in special purpose vehicles
and instruments, and then sell off the payment streams as mortgagebacked securities into the capital markets.151 Then, as now, the market
for the downstream products created with the mortgages sought higher
and higher returns without controlling, structuring, or taking into account,
the added risk that necessarily accompanied those higher returns.152
146. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14. (“[T]he expectation of prolonged low
real rates is, as policymakers hoped, edging investors down riskier paths.”).
147. Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14. (“This demand for fixed-income
investment has lowered borrowing costs for businesses. . . . Low rates have not just made life
easier for some consumers and businesses by reducing borrowing costs. They have also
allowed firms to substitute debt for equity. This usually boosts earnings per share, which
makes it an attractive choice for executives motivated by share options.”).
148. Greg Roumeliotis, Lauren Tara LaCapra & Soyoung Kim, Wall Street Banks Take
Heart from Leveraged Loan Exams, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2014) (“Making junk-rated loans to
companies is a lucrative, high-margin business for major Wall Street banks. Last year
leveraged loans generated $1.47 billion in fees in the United States alone.”).
149. See Antoine Gara, JPMorgan Sees Parallel to Subprime Bust at Regional Banks,
THE STREET (Apr. 8, 2014) (“‘The boom in these loans has been fed by continued surge in
leveraged loan funds. The genesis of this voracious interest is the search for yield, similar to
the strong growth in subprime mortgages in 2006-2007,’ Juanuja [of JPMorgan] said.”).
150. See, e.g., Robin Paul Malloy, U.S. Mortgage Markets: A Tale of Self-correcting
Markets, Parallel Lives and Other People’s Money, THE FUTURE OF FIN. REG. (Eds. Iain
MacNeil & Justin O’Brien) 40–50, Hart: 2010 (describing the pre-crisis mortgage lending
market and the effects of government subsidies).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 48 (“From top to bottom, the housing and the primary and secondary
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Today, many banks are themselves behaving similar to the
subprime mortgage originators that issued subprime mortgages to lessqualified borrowers without fearing default, as the loans can be
syndicated among banks or loan participations can be sold in an active
and rapidly growing market to investors other than banks. 153 Leveraged
loans are generally arranged by one or a few banks, but the arrangers
merely negotiate the terms of the loans on behalf of a syndicate of
investors that actually underwrite the loans.154 Banks therefore have
every incentive to arrange leveraged loans, as they can collect the
arrangement fees and then sell off or hedge their own exposure, removing
some of their skin from the game, just as mortgage originators found
creative ways to sell off questionable mortgage products that they never
planned to hold.155
Market trends suggest that demand by investors for high-yielding
participations in leveraged loans, and not the credit quality of the
borrowers, is driving the rapidly growing market.156 For example, Fifth
Third Bank, N.A. “has grown its leveraged loan syndication volume to
$5.3 billion in 2013 from $1.2 billion in 2011,” and Regions Financial
Bank “grew volumes to $4.5 billion from $1.9 billion over the same
period.”157
Among the nation’s largest banks, Citigroup has stepped
up its leveraged loan issuance the fastest, with volumes

mortgage markets operate on using other people’s money . . . .Consequently, no one has any
‘skin’ in the game.”).
153. Mortgage originators are now required to retain some exposure to the mortgages that
they issue unless the mortgage terms and borrowers meet specific underwriting standards.
See 15 U.S.C. 1639c (2015); Jeffrey R. Favitta, Comment, The Exception that Ate the Rule:
Why QRM Should Not Equal QM, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 363, 364–70 (2014). A similar
retention requirement for leveraged loans, though not included in Dodd-Frank or the
Guidance, would further encourage banks to limit high-risk loan issuance.
154. See LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!how-areloans-syndicated (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
155. See id. (“The ‘retail’ market for a syndicated loan consists of banks and, in the case
of leveraged transactions, finance companies and institutional investors such as mutual funds,
structured finance vehicles and hedge funds.”).
156. See Gara, supra note 149 (“For some regional banks, leveraged loan volumes have
risen three-to-fourfold over the past few years, while the nation’s largest banks have also
rapidly increased their issuance amid booming LBO markets.”).
157. See Gara, supra note 149.
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rising 74 percent from 2011 to 2013, and LBO [leveraged
buyout] underwriting fees the fastest among large banks.
Bank of America and Wells Fargo have also seen
issuance rise 30 percent year over year, with leveraged
loan fees accounting for 33 percent to 38 percent of their
underwriting fees.158
Leveraged lending fees and interest are, therefore, becoming a significant
source of income for banks, as the pool of loans grows rapidly deeper.159
In addition, increasing activity in mergers and acquisitions, including
leveraged buyouts, has fueled additional leveraged lending.
In sum, extended low interest rates have created an economic
environment in which investors must accept more risk for the same level
of returns when compared to the period before the 2008 financial crisis.160
Leveraged loans allow banks to offer higher returns to investors, while
also allowing companies and their owners the prospect of higher return
on equity through increased debt in their capital structures. 161 Finally,
banks are willing to arrange more leveraged loans because they are
confident that they will be able to syndicate the loans to other investors
and thus leave themselves only minimaly exposed to default and loss
risks.162 Given the volume of leveraged loans in the market and the
parallels with the subprime mortgage-backed securities market leading
158. See Gara, supra note 149. Leveraged buyouts are transactions whereby an acquiring
company (often a private equity-backed company) purchases a target company using mostly
debt raised by pledging the target company or its assets as collateral. See, e.g., Josh Kosman,
Why Private Equity Firms Like Bain Really Are the Worst of Capitalism, ROLLING STONE
(May 23, 2012). “For the most part, issuers undertake leveraged loans for four reasons: [t]o
support an M&A-related transaction; [t]o back a recapitalization of a company’s balance
sheet; [t]o refinance debt; [t]o fund general corporate purposes or project finance.”
LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!definingleveraged (last
visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“Debt as a share of total sources of funding for the LBO can range
from 50% to upwards of 75%.”).
159. See Gara, supra note 149; see also Rob Tricchinelli, Corporate Debt Liquidity
Problems Pose “Systemic Risk,” Gallagher Says, [2015] BANKING DAILY (BNA) NO. 41
(Mar. 3, 2015) (“Liquidity problems in corporate debt markets pose a ‘systemic risk’ to the
financial system, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Daniel Gallagher said March 2.
Growing issuances of corporate debt paired with a drop in many dealers’ inventory will cause
widespread trouble if interest rates rise.”).
160. See supra notes 140 through 145, and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Six Years of Low Interest Rates, supra note 14.
162. See, e.g., Roumeliotis, supra note 148.
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up to the 2008 financial crisis, it is no surprise that regulators have paid
increasing attention to bank underwriting standards.163 The Guidance
itself, however, seemed to have little effect on the market until regulators
began enforcing it with a stern warning to the industry in general and
issuing MRIA letters for noncompliance during bank examinations.164
VI. PARTICIPATORY REGULATION – A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
While the Guidance and bank regulators’ subsequent actions now
seem to be finally reducing risk in the leveraged lending market,165 such
a delayed response by the market seems risky and unacceptable. This
section briefly describes how a self-regulatory body might be more
effective at shaping banks’ lending practices than external regulatory
measures like the Guidance.
A.

Regulatory Challenge

Although not required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Guidance was
similar to many of the regulatory overhauls since the Dodd-Frank Act in
that it evolved in a delayed, fragmented, and generalized regulatory
fashion.166 It is worth noting that the Guidance was issued by all three
bank regulatory agencies,167 although some regulators sought to enforce
it more aggressively than others.168 Furthermore, regulators issued the
Guidance as a mandate without clear metrics, bright line rules or clear
safe harbors.169 It caused “considerable confusion” regarding
163. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 150.
164. See, e.g., Nicolaci de Costa, supra note 105; Tan & Racy, supra note 69; Harrison et

al., supra note 72.
165. Shared National Credits Program Review 2015, supra note 16, at 3.
166. See Saule Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 83, 88 (2011) (“The Dodd-Frank Act failed to eliminate the structural basis
for regulatory arbitrage by retaining the fundamental principle of regulatory fragmentation.”).
167. The Guidance was issued by the Fed, the OCC, and FDIC. See Interagency Guidance
on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766 (Mar. 22, 2013).
168. Several news articles and certain changes in league tables (tracking the number and
volume of loans made by major banks) suggest that the OCC was somewhat more zealous in
implementing the Guidance than the Fed, placing nationally chartered banks at a regulatory
and market disadvantage. See e.g., LaCapra, supra note 98.
169. Despite several concerns over the proposed Guidance’s definition of leveraged
lending, regulators made no changes to the definition in the final version. Interagency
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expectations and implementation.170 As leveraged lending continued
apace into 2014, perhaps the most troubling result initially was its
migration into “shadow banks,” less regulated financial entities beyond
the bailiwick of the FDIC, OCC, or the Fed.171
These difficulties in implementation point to a more fundamental
problem with the present regulatory framework of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Reliance on a fragmented regulatory approach with a sometimes
adversarial relationship between regulators and market players is very
much a product of twentieth century regulatory thinking, 172 and
unsuitable for the complexity of modern U.S. and global financial
markets.173 Modern markets require “active participation in the
regulatory process” by the market participants to be regulated, as “a
purely unilateral command-and-control [regulatory] manner will
inevitably encounter the fundamental problem of regulatory arbitrage,
whereby financial institutions find new ways to get around government
rules.”174 While regulatory arbitrage was, and is, a serious concern, in the
case of the Guidance, banks were initially incapable of compliance
because regulators did not make their expectations clear.175
B.

Self-regulation as a Potential Solution

Instead of issuing the Guidance and waiting over eighteen months
for the Shared National Credits Review to give it scope and substance,

Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. at 17768.
170. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 15.
171. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 103.
172. See Omarova, supra note 167 (“Contrary to popular expectations, the Dodd-Frank
Act largely retained the existing regulatory structure in the financial services sector . . .
Congress opted against large-scale structural reform.”).
173. See Omarova, supra note 167, at 92–94 (describing the Volcker Rule and noting
“these new statutory prohibitions rest on an old fiction . . . that the key sources of financial
risk to banks can be effectively controlled through imposing certain formalistic, institutionbased restrictions . . . . These assumptions tend to over-simplify the dynamics of modern
financial services businesses.”).
174. See Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2011) (noting that such arbitrage creates “a
never-ending spiral of rulemaking and rule evading” (citing Victor Vleischer, Regulatory
Arbitrage (U. of Colo. Law Sch. Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-11, 2010,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1567212.)).
175. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 15; Braithwaite, supra note 103.
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regulators should have involved market participants more directly to
secure and leverage their expertise and thus tailor market-stabilizing
solutions in a more collaborative and effective way. A more cooperative
but supervised form of self-regulation would allow market participants
and regulators to escape the cycle of regulatory arbitrage and provide
greater and more timely responsiveness and stability in complex
financial markets.176 Similar systems have been effective in the securities
and commodity markets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, and the National Futures Association), but no similar selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) currently exists for the banking
industry.177
The most immediate and perhaps simplest solution may be to
expand the responsibilities and powers of the LSTA to include a selfregulatory function.178 The LSTA currently “foster[s] cooperation and
coordination among all loan market participants, facilitating just and
equitable market principles,” and also serves as an industry advocacy
group.179 A more robust and empowered version of the organization, with
government mandates and regulatory oversight, could expand its role to
become an industry self-regulator. While a thorough discussion of
precisely how a more participatory system of “embedded self-regulation”
would work is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth exploring why
such a system would be particularly well-suited to deal with the
regulatory challenge of leveraged lending.180
First, the relatively limited number of banks engaged in leveraged
lending already possess the best available information regarding the
credits they arrange and underwrite. Moreover, they have the most
176. See Omarova, supra note 175, at 417 (“[T]he dynamics of the twenty-first century
global financial market demand a new approach to industry self-regulation, which has the
potential to be much more comprehensive and systemic in its scope and operation.”).
177. See Omarova, supra note 175, at 464–65.
178. See LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING ASSOCIATION, http://www.lsta.org/about.
179. Id.
180. For a thorough discussion of “embedded self-regulation” and “New Governance”
theory, see Omarova, supra note 175. See also John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation:
A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982); Michael
Douglas, Federal Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN L.
REV. 171 (1995); Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial
Industry, 23 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2003).
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current and sophisticated understanding of the leveraged lending market
as a whole. Both of these factors place them in the best informational
position to understand the individual risk and the collective risk posed by
any individual loan or set of credits.181 Second, a self-regulatory body
would not face the communication challenges that the present adversarial
and patchwork regulatory structure has created. As lenders were only
peripherally involved in the creation and drafting of the Guidance, they
also had great difficulty in interpreting and implementing it.182 Finally,
an SRO would be in a position to force participating banks to accept and
acknowledge responsibility for market failures and the prospect that
government bailouts and other risk reducing and market stabilizing
programs are no longer a viable solution to market failures.183 This would
incentivize market participants to not only establish sound rules and
guidelines for individual and systemic stability, but also incentivize
compliance with those guidelines, as opposed to rewarding successful
avoidance through arbitrage.
The almost two-year lag between the issuance of the Guidance
and a measurable reduction of leverage ratios in the leveraged lending
market reflects the lack of clarity in the market regarding precisely what
regulators intended or required, as well as the consequences for noncompliance.184 A more open and collaborative dialogue including both
regulators and market participants representing both lenders and
borrowers, or their counsel, might have yielded a clearer understanding
of regulators’ expectations and a greater appreciation for the basis of their
concern. Such a process might also incentivize the development and
implementation of best practices for th market and foster a more level
playin fields. For example, instead of leaving banks to define leveraged
lending individually, regulators might have facilitated an industry
discussion to craft a uniform definition and thereby provided clearer
guidelines with industry input, thus eliminating the uncertainty of

181. See Omarova, supra note 175. (discussing the informational advantages that can be
leveraged by embedded self-regulatory systems in the financial industry).
182. See supra notes 99 through 108, and accompanying text.
183. See Omarova, supra note 175. (discussing the establishment of a “community of
fate” in the financial industry, whereby each participant understands that the survival of each
participant is dependent on the viability of the system as a whole).
184. See supra Part III.
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whether or not a particular credit would be criticized.
In addition to providing clearer guidance to banks, an established
industry SRO could also implement uniform standards and compliance.
A failure to comply with industry guidelines could be corrected both
more informally and more effectively by other market participants, since
the major banks generally rely on one another when syndicating both
leveraged loans and investment grade loans. If a bank earned a reputation
for pushing the envelope in leveraged deals, a SRO might have the ability
to discourage other banks from helping the offending institution to
syndicate such deals, and even the threat of such a sanction would have
to be taken at least as seriously as the MRIA letter that Credit Suisse
received in September 2014.
Finally, an established SRO would function with more accurate
and current information than external regulators. By definition, an
external regulator must expend significant resources to understand and
react to the market from the outside looking in, while a self-regulatory
body would already have a sophisticated understanding of the lending
market. Market trends in lender protections and borrower flexibility can
change relatively quickly, and it makes little sense to have regulators
duplicate the work that market participants must do to negotiate and
syndicate the loans in the first place. In the case of the Guidance, an SRO
could have monitored leveraged lending internally on a real time and
ongoing basis without having to wait for an annual Shared National
Credits Report. Arguably, such a regulator would also act more
proactively out of an interest in preserving the market’s autonomy and
vibrancy, especially if it were clear that the options for market
participants were to either effectively regulate themselves or be excluded
from or restricted in the market and thus lose substantial influence and
market share.
VII. CONCLUSION
While there are some indications that the Guidance is beginning
to curb risk in the syndicated leveraged loan market, the process has not
been a smooth or timely one. The Guidance provided some insight into
regulators’ expectations, but it was not until the subsequent publication
of the 2014 Shared National Credits Review that banks had any real
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clarity regarding how the Guidance was to be implemented and applied.
Furthermore, significant market forces continue to incentivize the kind of
risky lending practices that the Guidance was intended to discourage.
This problem is symptomatic of the present regulatory structure, and a
self-regulatory framework could provide more effective individual bank
and systemic risk management.

